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Efficiency and Bargaining Power in the Interbank Loan Market

Author

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  • Jason Allen
  • James Chapman
  • Federico Echenique
  • Matthew Shum

Abstract

Using detailed loan transactions-level data we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market, and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada we show that while the market is fairly efficient, some degree of inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada’s operations as well as phases of the 2007- 2008 financial crisis, where more liquidity intervention implies more inefficiency. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply towards borrowers as the financial crisis progressed, and towards riskier borrowers. This supports a nuanced version of the Too- Big-To-Fail story, whereby participants continued to lend to riskier banks at favorable rates, not because of explicit support to the riskier banks provided by governmental authorities, but rather due to the collective self-interest of these banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Allen & James Chapman & Federico Echenique & Matthew Shum, 2012. "Efficiency and Bargaining Power in the Interbank Loan Market," Staff Working Papers 12-29, Bank of Canada.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:12-29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Noton & Andrés Elberg, 2013. "Revealing Bargaining Power through Actual Wholesale Prices," Documentos de Trabajo 304, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    2. Olivier Armantier & Adam Copeland, 2012. "Assessing the quality of “Furfine-based” algorithms," Staff Reports 575, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    3. Kyungmin Kim, 2017. "A Price-Differentiation Model of the Interbank Market and Its Application to a Financial Crisis," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-065, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Marius A. Zoican & Lucyna A. Górnicka, 2013. "Banking Unions: Distorted Incentives and Efficient Bank Resolution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-184/VI, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 May 2014.
    5. Patricia Palhau Mora, 2018. "The “Too Big to Fail” Subsidy in Canada: Some Estimates," Staff Working Papers 18-9, Bank of Canada.
    6. Silvio Schumacher, 2016. "Networks and lending conditions: Empirical evidence from the Swiss franc money markets," Working Papers 2016-12, Swiss National Bank.
    7. Fuchun Li & Héctor Pérez Saiz, 2016. "Measuring Systemic Risk Across Financial Market Infrastructures," Staff Working Papers 16-10, Bank of Canada.
    8. Armantier, Olivier & Copeland, Adam, 2015. "Challenges in identifying interbank loans," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 21-1, pages 1-17.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Institutions; Payment; clearing; and settlement systems;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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