Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets
We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under certain conditions, illiquidity discounts are higher when counterparties are harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the fraction of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or hedging demand are larger. Supply shocks cause prices to jump, and then 'recover' over time, with a time signature that is exaggerated by search frictions. We discuss a variety of empirical implications.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Amihud, Yakov & Mendelson, Haim, 1986. "Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 223-249, December.
- Amihud, Yakov & Mendelson, Haim & Pedersen, Lasse Heje, 2006.
"Liquidity and Asset Prices,"
Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance,
now publishers, vol. 1(4), pages 269-364, February.
- Viral V. Acharya & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2004.
"Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk,"
NBER Working Papers
10814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5491. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.