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A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining

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  • Roth, Alvin E

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  • Roth, Alvin E, 1985. "A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 207-211, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:53:y:1985:i:1:p:207-11
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    Cited by:

    1. Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 120-140, October.
    2. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1996. "Testing between alternative wage-employment bargaining models using Belgian aggregate data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 43-64, August.
    3. Kibris, Ozgur, 2002. "Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 91-110, April.
    4. Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski A., 2011. "Procedurally Fair Income Taxation Schemes," Research Memorandum 035, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. van den Boom, G.J.M., 1987. "Some modifications and applications of Rubinstein's perfect equilibrium model of bargaining," Research Memorandum dfa81430-799a-4a9a-a52a-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Ok, Efe A. & Benoît, Jean-Pierre, 2007. "Delay aversion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 71-113, March.
    7. Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans, 2012. "Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 103-118.
    8. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
    9. Pol Antràs & Arnaud Costinot, 2011. "Intermediated Trade," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1319-1374.
    10. Raduna, Daniela Viviana & Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2011. "Risk aversion influence on insurance market," MPRA Paper 37725, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Feb 2012.
    11. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2016. "The Condorcet paradox revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(1), pages 141-186, June.
    12. Kohler, Stefan, 2013. "Inequality aversion causes equal or unequal division in alternating-offer bargaining," MPRA Paper 40764, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Rosato, Antonio, 2017. "Sequential negotiations with loss-averse buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 290-304.
    14. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1989. "Un modelo de renegociación continua de la deuda soberana," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 4(1), pages 3-29.
    15. White, Lucy, 2008. "Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 211-231, January.
    16. Srivastava, Joydeep, 2001. "The Role of Inferences in Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information: Some Experimental Evidence," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 166-187, May.
    17. Viaene, Stijn & Veugelers, Reinhilde & Dedene, Guido, 2002. "Insurance bargaining under risk aversion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 245-259, March.
    18. Hans Gersbach & Bernhard Pachl, 2006. "Cake Division by Majority Decision," CESifo Working Paper Series 1872, CESifo Group Munich.
    19. Spencer, Michael Andrew, 1995. "Structured and unstructured bargaining with positive transaction costs: an experimental investigation," ISU General Staff Papers 1995010108000018183, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    20. White, Lucy, 2006. "Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. repec:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9584-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. repec:eee:matsoc:v:91:y:2018:i:c:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O’Connell, Stephen, 2008. "On Risk Aversion in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 878, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    24. Houba, Harold, 2008. "On continuous-time Markov processes in bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 280-283, August.

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