A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel
This research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model. We use the Nash bargaining solution to determine wholesale prices and thus how margins are split in the channel. Equilibrium margins are a function of demand primitives and of retailer and manufacturer bargaining power. Bargaining power is itself a function of exogenous retail and manufacturer characteristics. The parties' bargaining positions are determined endogenously from the estimated substitution patterns on the demand side. The more they have to lose in a negotiation relative to an outside option, the weaker the bargaining position. We use the proposed bargaining model to investigate the role of the three main factors that have been blamed for the power shift from manufacturers to retailers in recent years (firm size increases, store brand introductions, and service level differentiation). In our empirical analysis of the German market for coffee, we find that bargaining power varies among the different manufacturer- retailer pairs. This result suggests that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a firm but rather depends on the negotiation partner. We are able to confirm empirically previous theoretical findings that there can be cases where the slice of the pie that goes to one of the channel members may decrease but the overall pie increases and compensates for the smaller share of profits.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015|
Phone: (650) 723-2146
Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Peter M. Guadagni & John D. C. Little, 1983. "A Logit Model of Brand Choice Calibrated on Scanner Data," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 203-238.
- William J. Baumol & Edward A. Ide, 1956. "Variety in Retailing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 3(1), pages 93-101, October.
- K. Sudhir & Vrinda Kadiyali & Vithala R. Rao, 2001. "Structural Analysis of Manufacturer Pricing in the Presence of a Strategic Retailer," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm229, Yale School of Management.
- Sofia Berto Villas-Boas, 2007. "Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 625-652.
- Villas-Boas, Sofia B., 2006. "Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers: inference with limited data," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0z26d2v9, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Villas-Boas, Sofia B., 2007. "Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers: inference with limited data," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt6gz1t778, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, February.
- Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Ordered bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1126-1143, October.
- Sunil Gupta, 1989. "Modeling Integrative, Multiple Issue Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(7), pages 788-806, July.
- Aviv Nevo, 2000. "Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(3), pages 395-421, Autumn.
- Vrinda Kadiyali & Pradeep Chintagunta & Naufel Vilcassim, 2000. "Manufacturer-Retailer Channel Interactions and Implications for Channel Power: An Empirical Investigation of Pricing in a Local Market," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(2), pages 127-148, September.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Timothy W. McGuire & Richard Staelin, 1983. "An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(2), pages 161-191.
- Jagmohan S. Raju & Raj Sethuraman & Sanjay K. Dhar, 1995. "The Introduction and Performance of Store Brands," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(6), pages 957-978, June.
- Steven M. Shugan, 1985. "Implicit Understandings in Channels of Distribution," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(4), pages 435-460, April.
- David Besanko & Sachin Gupta & Dipak Jain, 1998. "Logit Demand Estimation Under Competitive Pricing Behavior: An Equilibrium Framework," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(11-Part-1), pages 1533-1547, November.
- David Besanko & Jean-Pierre Dubé & Sachin Gupta, 2005. "Own-Brand and Cross-Brand Retail Pass-Through," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(1), pages 123-137, July.
- Fiona Scott Morton & Florian Zettelmeyer, 2004. "The Strategic Positioning of Store Brands in Retailer--Manufacturer Negotiations," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 24(2), pages 161-194, 03.
- Bresnahan, Timothy F., 1982. "The oligopoly solution concept is identified," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 10(1-2), pages 87-92.
- S. Chan Choi, 1991. "Price Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 271-296.
- Nevo, Aviv, 1998. "Identification of the oligopoly solution concept in a differentiated-products industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 391-395, June.
- Draganska, Michaela & Klapper, Daniel, 2006. "Retail Environment and Manufacturer Competitive Intensity," Research Papers 1953, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Sanjay K. Dhar & Stephen J. Hoch, 1997. "Why Store Brand Penetration Varies by Retailer," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 16(3), pages 208-227.
- Slade, Margaret E, 1995. "Product Rivalry with Multiple Strategic Weapons: An Analysis of Price and Advertising Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 445-476, Fall.
- Koen Pauwels & Shuba Srinivasan, 2004. "Who Benefits from Store Brand Entry?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 364-390, July.
- Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
- Abel P. Jeuland & Steven M. Shugan, 1988. "Reply To: Managing Channel Profits: Comment," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 103-106.
- Narasimhan, Chakravarthi & Wilcox, Ronald T, 1998. "Private Labels and the Channel Relationship: A Cross-Category Analysis," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(4), pages 573-600, October.
- Lakshman Krishnamurthi & S. P. Raj, 1991. "An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Brand Loyalty and Consumer Price Elasticity," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(2), pages 172-183.
- Hartmann, Wesley R. & Nair, Harikesh S., 2007. "Retail Competition and the Dynamics of Consumer Demand for Tied Goods," Research Papers 1990, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- J. Miguel Villas-Boas & Russell S. Winer, 1999. "Endogeneity in Brand Choice Models," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(10), pages 1324-1338, October.
- Paul R. Messinger & Chakravarthi Narasimhan, 1995. "Has Power Shifted in the Grocery Channel?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(2), pages 189-223. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.