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Individually rational union membership

  • Bulkley, George
  • Myles, Gareth D.

The Analysis of the determinants of union membership has typically met difficulties with the free-rider problem that union membership is not individually-rational. We assume that workers differ in their reservation wages and hence in their choice of contracts, preventing free-riding on the contarct choice of others.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 17 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 117-137

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:117-137
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  1. Naylor, R. & Cripps, M., 1991. "An Economic Theory of the Open Shop Trade Union," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 372, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Robin Naylor, 1989. "Strikes, Free Riders, and Social Customs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 771-785.
  3. Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D & Pearson, Bernard R, 2001. " On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 1-22, January.
  4. Alison L. Booth, 1985. "The Free Rider Problem and a Social Custom Model of Trade Union Membership," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 253-261.
  5. Myles, G.D. & Naylor, R.A., 1990. "Do Union Reduce Discrimination? A Model Of Nash Bargaining Between A Union And An Employeur With Discriminatory Tastes," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 366, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  6. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Wage bargaining with incomplete information in an unionized Cournot oligopoly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 353-374, May.
  7. Moreton, David R., 1998. "An open shop trade union model of wages, effort and membership," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 511-527, August.
  8. Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D., 1997. "Bargaining over effort," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 375-384, May.
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