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Bargaining over effort

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  • Bulkley, George
  • Myles, Gareth D.

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  • Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D., 1997. "Bargaining over effort," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 375-384, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:375-384
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sampson, Anthony A., 1993. "Bargaining over effort and the monitoring role of unions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 371-381, August.
    2. Andrews, Martyn & Simmons, Robert, 1995. "Are Effort Bargaining Models Consistent with the Facts? An Assessment of the Early 1980s," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 62(247), pages 313-334, August.
    3. Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D, 1996. "Trade Unions, Efficiency Wages, and Shirking," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 75-88, January.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    5. Nickell, S. & Wadhwani, S. & Wall, M., 1989. "Unions And Productivity Growth In Britain, 1974-86: Evidence From Uk Company Accounts Data," Papers 353, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Erkki Koskela & Ronnie Schöb, 2012. "Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining and Individual Effort Determination," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 749-771, July.
    2. Koskela, Erkki & König, Jan, 2009. "Can Profit Sharing Lower Flexible Outsourcing? A Note," IZA Discussion Papers 4063, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. K Clark & M Tomlinson, 2001. "The Determinants of Work Effort: Evidence from the Employment in Britain Survey," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0113, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    4. Kate Bishop & Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2003. "While Labour Hoarding May Be Over, Insiders??? Control Is Not. Determinants Of Employment Growth In Polish Large Firms, 1996-2001," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-593, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    5. Luigi Siciliani & Anderson Stanciole, 2013. "Bargaining and the provision of health services," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 14(3), pages 391-406, June.
    6. Novella Maugeri, 2010. "Macroeconomic Implications of Near Rational Behavior: an Application to the Italian Phillips Curve," Department of Economics University of Siena 587, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    7. Jacques Bughin & Michele Cincera, 2020. "F.O.G. and teleworking: Some labor economics of covid-19," Working Papers TIMES² 2020-037, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D., 2001. "Individually rational union membership," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 117-137, March.
    9. Chi-Hsin Wu & Chia-Ying Liu, 2010. "Do Trade Unions Deteriorate International Competitiveness? Reconciliation of the Discrepancy Between Theory and Practice," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 38(2), pages 145-155, June.

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