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Can Profit Sharing Lower Flexible Outsourcing? A Note

  • Erkki Koskela
  • Jan König
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    We analyze the following question associated with flexible outsourcing under imperfect domestic labour market: How does the implementation of profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing? We show that in general profit sharing has a negative effect on low skilled wage and thus an outsourcing decreasing character. However due to labour union determination of effort a constant effort level will result so that in this case firm’s optimal choice of profit sharing is zero.

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    Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2606.

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    Date of creation: 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2606
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    8. Sampson, Anthony A., 1993. "Bargaining over effort and the monitoring role of unions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 371-381, August.
    9. Philip Du Caju & Erwan Gautier & Daphne Momferatu & Melanie Ward-Warmedinger, 2009. "Institutional Features of Wage Bargaining in 23 European Countries, the US and Japan," Ekonomia, Cyprus Economic Society and University of Cyprus, vol. 12(2), pages 57-108, Winter.
    10. Meenakshi Rishi & Sweta C. Saxena, 2005. "Is Outsourcing Really As Bad As It Is Made To Sound? A Re- Assessment And Some Perspective," Macroeconomics 0508009, EconWPA.
    11. Wadhwani, Sushil & Wall, Martin, 1990. "The Effects of Profit-Sharing on Employment, Wages, Stock Returns and Productivity: Evidence from UK Micro-data," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(399), pages 1-17, March.
    12. Cahuc, Pierre & Dormont, Brigitte, 1997. "Profit-sharing: Does it increase productivity and employment? A theoretical model and empirical evidence on French micro data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 293-319, September.
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    14. Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D., 1997. "Bargaining over effort," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 375-384, May.
    15. Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D, 1996. "Trade Unions, Efficiency Wages, and Shirking," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 75-88, January.
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    17. Simon P. Anderson & Michael Devereux, 1989. "Profit-Sharing and Optimal Labour Contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 425-33, May.
    18. Mine Zeynep Senses, 2006. "The Effects of Outsourcing on the Elasticity of Labor Demand," Working Papers 06-07, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    19. Koskela, Erkki & Poutvaara, Panu, 2008. "Flexible Outsourcing and the Impacts of Labour Taxation in European Welfare States," IZA Discussion Papers 3699, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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    22. Salop, Steven C, 1979. "A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 117-25, March.
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