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Profit sharing, worker effort, and double-sided moral hazard in an efficiency wage model

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  • Chang, Juin-jen
  • Lai, Ching-chong
  • Lin, Chung-cheng

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  • Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong & Lin, Chung-cheng, 2003. "Profit sharing, worker effort, and double-sided moral hazard in an efficiency wage model," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 75-93, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:31:y:2003:i:1:p:75-93
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    1. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State versus Private Ownership," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 133-150, Fall.
    2. Pisauro, Giuseppe, 1991. "The effect of taxes on labour in efficiency wage models," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 329-345, December.
    3. Lawrence F. Katz, 1986. "Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1, pages 235-290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    6. Dow, Gregory K., 2000. "On the Neutrality of Asset Ownership for Work Incentives," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 581-605, September.
    7. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    8. Weitzman, Martin L, 1985. "The Simple Macroeconomics of Profit Sharing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 937-953, December.
    9. John Kelly & Caroline Kelly, 1991. "‘Them and Us’: Social Psychology and ‘The New Industrial Relations’," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 29(1), pages 25-48, March.
    10. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    12. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring.
    13. Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1988. "Profit-Related Pay: Prose Discovered," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(392), pages 720-730, September.
    14. Freeman, Richard B. & Weitzman, Martin L., 1987. "Bonuses and employment in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 168-194, June.
    15. Duncan P. Mann & Jennifer P. Wissink, 1988. "Money-Back Contracts with Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 285-292, Summer.
    16. George A. Akerlof & Lawrence F. Katz, 1989. "Workers' Trust Funds and the Logic of Wage Profiles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(3), pages 525-536.
    17. Douglas L. Kruse, 1993. "Does Profit Sharing Affect Productivity?," NBER Working Papers 4542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Hajime Miyazaki, 1984. "Work Norms and Involuntary Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(2), pages 297-311.
    19. Carmichael, Lorne, 1985. "Can Unemployment Be Involuntary? Comment [Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device]," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1213-1214, December.
    20. Wadhwani, Sushil B, 1987. "Profit-Sharing and Meade's Discriminating Labour-Capital Partnerships: A Review Article," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 421-442, September.
    21. William T. Dickens & Lawrence F. Katz & Kevin Lang & Lawrence H. Summers, 1990. "Why Do Firms Monitor Workers?," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Yoram Weiss & Gideon Fishelson (ed.), Advances in the Theory and Measurement of Unemployment, chapter 6, pages 159-171, Palgrave Macmillan.
    22. Weitzman, Martin L, 1983. "Some Macroeconomic Implications of Alternative Compensation Systems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(372), pages 763-783, December.
    23. Cahuc, Pierre & Dormont, Brigitte, 1997. "Profit-sharing: Does it increase productivity and employment? A theoretical model and empirical evidence on French micro data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 293-319, September.
    24. Joel Sobel & Ichiro Takahashi, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(3), pages 411-426.
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    1. Marina Albanese & Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2017. "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: Worker insurance and wage setting in worker owned enterprises," DEM Working Papers 2017/09, Department of Economics and Management.
    2. Chia-ying Liu & Juin-jen Chang, 2011. "Macroeconomic implications of a sharing compensation scheme in a model of endogenous growth," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(1), pages 57-75, January.
    3. Marina Albanese & Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2019. "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: wage setting in worker owned enterprises," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(3), pages 653-671, October.
    4. D'Amato, Valeria & Di Lorenzo, Emilia & Piscopo, Gabriella & Sibillo, Marilena & Trotta, Annarita, 2024. "Insurance business and social sustainability: A proposal," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

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