Competitive Prizes: When Less Scrutiny Induces More Effort
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- Dubey, Pradeep & Wu, Chien-wei, 2001. "Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 311-336, December.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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- Judith Avrahami & Werner Gueth & Yaakov Kareev & Tobias Uske, 2017. "On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 18(1), pages 81-98, February.
- Yohan Pelosse, 2014. "Dynamic Difference-Form Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 401-426, June.
- Hind Sami & Nadia Joubert & Jean-Louis Rullière, 2010.
"Le mieux, ennemi du bien : approche expérimentale du contrôle comme mécanisme de filtrage,"
Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 195(4), pages 127-146.
- Nadia Joubert & Jean-Louis Rullière & Hind Sami, 2010. "Le mieux, ennemi du bien : approche expérimentale du contrôle comme mécanisme de filtrage," Post-Print halshs-00664890, HAL.
- H. Sami & N. Joubert & Jean-Louis Rullière, 2010. "Le mieux ennemi du bien : approche expérimentale du contrôle comme mécanisme de filtrage," Post-Print hal-00325419, HAL.
- Sami, Hind, 2009.
"Random monitoring in financing relationships,"
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 239-252, May.
- Hind Sami, 2009. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," Post-Print halshs-00522629, HAL.
- Yaakov Kareev & Judith Avrahami, 2006. "Choosing Between Adaptive Agents: Some Unexpected Implications of Level of Scrutiny," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000521, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Geanakoplos, John, 2010.
"Grading exams: 100,99,98,... or A,B,C?,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 72-94, May.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2009. "Grading Exams: 100, 99, 98,...or A, B, C?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1710, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2009. "Grading Exams: 100, 99, 98,... or A, B, C?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000361, David K. Levine.
- Pelosse, Yohan, 2011. "Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 740-748.
- Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008.
"How often should you open the door?: Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 820-831, September.
- Andrea Ichino & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Diskussionsschriften dp0319, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gerd Muehlheusser & Andrea Ichino, 2004. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 60, Econometric Society.
- Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," IZA Discussion Papers 987, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Yaakov Kareev & Judith Avrahami, 2006. "Choosing Between Adaptive Agents: Some Unexpected Implications of Level of Scrutiny," Discussion Paper Series dp436, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2022. "Information manipulation and competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 245-263.
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More about this item
Keywords
Competitive prizes; extensive form games; information patterns; strategic equilibria; optimal sample sizes;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2000-05-30 (Microeconomics)
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