Choosing Between Adaptive Agents: Some Unexpected Implications of Level of Scrutiny
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- Pradeep Dubey & Chien-wei Wu, 2000.
"Competitive Prizes: When Less Scrutiny Induces More Effort,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1255, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Wu, Chien-wei, 2001. "Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 311-336, December.
- Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai, 1996. "More monitoring can induce less effort," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 113-123, July.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori, 2003.
"Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-24, January.
- Pradeep Dubey & Ori Haimanko, 2000. "Optimal Scrutiny in Multi-Period Promotion Tournaments," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1254, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-79, April.
- Block, M K & Heineke, J M, 1973. "The Allocation of Effort under Uncertainty: The Case of Risk-averse Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 376-85, Part I, M.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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