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Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry

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  • Timothy Mathews
  • Soiliou Namoro

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  • Timothy Mathews & Soiliou Namoro, 2008. "Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 1-23, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:95:y:2008:i:1:p:1-23
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-008-0017-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-364, June.
    3. Amegashie, J.A. & Wu, X., 2004. "Self Selection in Competing All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers 2004-1, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    4. Guido Friebel & Alexander Matros, 2005. "A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 105-111, July.
    5. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-289, March.
    6. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    7. Dilip Mookherjee, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 433-446.
    8. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
    9. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-1324, December.
    10. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cason, Timothy N. & Masters, William A. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2010. "Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 604-611, October.
    2. Zak, Uri & Avrahami, Judith & Kareev, Yaakov, 2019. "The lions–foxes dilemma: The case of chess tournaments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 75(PB).
    3. John Morgan & Henrik Orzen & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Endogenous entry in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 435-463, October.
    4. John Morgan & Henrik Orzen & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Endogenous entry in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 435-463, October.
    5. Soiliou Namoro, 2008. "The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment," Working Paper 373, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Nov 2008.
    6. Kosmas Marinakis & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, 2012. "A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 161-190, March.
    7. Brian M. Mills & Dae Hee Kwak & Joon Sung Lee & Woo-Young Lee, 2014. "Competitive environments in fantasy sports gaming: effects of entry fees and rewards on opposition quality and league sorting," International Gambling Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 161-180, August.
    8. Timothy Mathews & Soiliou Daw Namoro & James W. Boudreau, 2023. "The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tournament; Entry decision; Employee compensation; J33; M52; C70;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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