Competition amongst contests
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- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2009. "Competition among contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 743-768.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- repec:eee:mateco:v:74:y:2018:i:c:p:21-34 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bernergård, Axel & Wärneryd, Karl, 2017.
"Self-Allocation in Contests,"
SSE Working Paper Series in Economics
2017:2, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Axel Bernergard & Karl Wärneryd, 2017. "Self-Allocation in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6636, CESifo Group Munich.
- Linnemer, Laurent & Visser, Michael, 2016.
"Self-selection in tournaments: The case of chess players,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 213-234.
- Laurent Linnemer & Michael Visser, 2016. "Self-selection in tournaments: The case of chess players," Post-Print hal-01629749, HAL.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2012.
"The distribution of talent across contests,"
Economics Working Papers
1298, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2013.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2018. "The Distribution of Talent Across Contests," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2ldopuhqfp8, Sciences Po.
- Ghazala Azmat & Marc Möller, 2012. "The Distribution of Talent across Contests," Working Papers 600, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Leuven, Edwin & Oosterbeek, Hessel & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2010.
"Splitting Tournaments,"
IZA Discussion Papers
5186, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Leuven, Edwin & Oosterbeek, Hessel & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2010. "Splitting Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 8016, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dahm, Matthias & Esteve, Patrícia,, 2013.
"Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes,"
Working Papers
2072/222197, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Matthias Dahm & Patricia Esteve, 2014. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Discussion Papers 2014-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- John Morgan & Dana Sisak & Felix Vardy, 2012. "On the Merits of Meritocracy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-077/1, Tinbergen Institute.
More about this item
Keywords
Contests; allocation of prizes; participation;JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2008-03-15 (All new papers)
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