Population uncertainty in contests
We study contests where the set of players is a random variable. If it is known for certain that there will be at least one participant, then aggregate contest expenditure in equilibrium is strictly lower in a contest with population uncertainty than in a non-uncertain contest with the same expected number of players. This suggests an explanation of, for example, why empirical studies show rent-seeking expenditures to be much lower than predicted by other theories. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
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