Individually Rational Union Membership
The Analysis of the determinants of union membership has typically met difficulties with the free-rider problem that union membership is not individually-rational. We assume that workers differ in their reservation wages and hence in their choice of contracts, preventing free-riding on the contarct choice of others.
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- Vannetelbosch, V. J., .
"Wage bargaining with incomplete information in an unionized Cournot oligopoly,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1303, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Wage bargaining with incomplete information in an unionized Cournot oligopoly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 353-374, May.
- Naylor, Robin & Cripps, Martin, 1993.
"An economic theory of the open shop trade union,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1599-1620, December.
- Naylor, R. & Cripps, M., 1991. "An Economic Theory of the Open Shop Trade Union," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 372, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Naylor, Robin, 1989.
"Strikes, Free Riders, and Social Customs,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 771-85, November.
- Naylor, Robin, 1987. "Strikes, Free Riders and Social Customs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 275, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Myles, Gareth D. & Naylor, Robin A., 1995.
"Do unions reduce discrimination? A model of Nash bargaining between a union and an employer with discriminatory tastes,"
Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 249-274, September.
- Myles, G.D. & Naylor, R.A., 1990. "Do Union Reduce Discrimination? A Model Of Nash Bargaining Between A Union And An Employeur With Discriminatory Tastes," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 366, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Moreton, David R., 1998. "An open shop trade union model of wages, effort and membership," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 511-527, August.
- Bulkley, G. & Myles, G.D. & Pearson, B.R., 2000.
"On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees,"
0009, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D., 1997. "Bargaining over effort," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 375-384, May.
- Booth, Alison L, 1985. "The Free Rider Problem and a Social Custom Model of Trade Union Membership," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(1), pages 253-61, February.
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