Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
We provide general conditions under which principal-agent problems admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our result covers as special cases those in which the agent has no private information Â–i.e., pure moral hazard Â–as well as those in which the agentÂ’s only action is a participation decision Â– i.e., pure adverse selection. We allow multi-dimensional actions and signals, as well as both Â…nancial and non-Â…nancial rewards. Beyond measurability, we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms. Consequently, our optimal mechanisms are optimal among all measurable mechanisms. A key to obtaining our result is to permit randomized mechanisms. We also provide conditions under which randomization is unnecessary.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://bfi.uchicago.edu/|
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- John R. Conlon, 2009. "Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 249-278, 01.
- Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard, 1994. "The First-Order Approach to Multi-signal Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 459-66, March.
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