Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard, 1994. "The First-Order Approach to Multi-signal Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 459-466, March.
- John R. Conlon, 2009. "Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 249-278, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2012.
"Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 753-772.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2012. "Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00813181, HAL.
- Noldeke, Georg & Larry Samuelson, 2015. "The Implementation Duality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1993, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-01-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2012-01-03 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2011-002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Toni Shears). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/mfichus.html .