Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation
The free rider problem is restated more precisely as the cheap rider problem. It is argued that if one takes account of the frequent or typical asymmetry in the interests of different enterprises in an industry, the individual incentives of many enterprises to participate in joint ventures are substantial.
Volume (Year): 5 (1974)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
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