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How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes

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  • Archontis L. Pantsios

    () (Liverpool Hope University)

  • Solomon W. Polachek

    () (State University of New York at Binghamton)

Abstract

Abstract The joint costs model states that increasing union and firm strike costs lead to fewer strikes. This paper shows that strike incidence need not decrease when joint strike costs increase. The innovation is to raise union and firm joint strike costs in an asymmetric way. The results indicate that increasing either party’s strike costs can have ambiguous effects on strike incidence. This ambiguity explains why higher strike costs need not always lead to fewer strikes, and thus accounts for the mixed success observed in studies that empirically test the joint costs model with strike incidence data.

Suggested Citation

  • Archontis L. Pantsios & Solomon W. Polachek, 2017. "How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(2), pages 149-161, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:45:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11293-017-9539-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-017-9539-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strike activity; Joint strike costs; Game of chicken;

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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