IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fau/aucocz/au2014_125.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Role of Trust in Determining the Propensity to Join Unofficial Strikes

Author

Listed:
  • Gabriele Ruiu

    () (University of Sassari, Department of Economics and Business, Sassari, Italy)

Abstract

This paper offers a contribution to the literature on labour strikes by analysing the effect of trust in labour disputes. We maintain that the higher (or lower) the level of confidence that workers place in unions (or firms), the more likely it is that they will be willing to participate in an unofficial strike. A very simple model is presented to clarify this idea. Using the World Value Survey data, we also empirically show that the probability of having or being willing to participate in unofficial strikes increases (or decreases) as the level of confidence placed in labour unions (or firms) increases, with the effect of confidence in labour unions being larger than that of confidence in firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriele Ruiu, 2014. "The Role of Trust in Determining the Propensity to Join Unofficial Strikes," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 125-148, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2014_125
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/download/id/161/type/attachment
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
    2. Giuseppe De Luca & Valeria Perotti, 2011. "Estimation of ordered response models with sample selection," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 11(2), pages 213-239, June.
    3. Gabler, Siegfried & Laisney, Francois & Lechner, Michael, 1993. "Seminonparametric Estimation of Binary-Choice Models with an Application to Labor-Force Participation," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 11(1), pages 61-80, January.
    4. David Card, 1990. "Strikes and Wages: A Test of an Asymmetric Information Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(3), pages 625-659.
    5. Guido Tabellini, 2010. "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 677-716, June.
    6. Holden, S. & Moene, K.O., 1998. "Measures to Improve Wage Formation in Sweden," Memorandum 26/1998, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    7. Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Gjerstad, Steven, 2007. "A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-45, April.
    8. Bera, Anil K & Jarque, Carlos M & Lee, Lung-Fei, 1984. "Testing the Normality Assumption in Limited Dependent Variable Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(3), pages 563-578, October.
    9. Guiso, Luigi & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "People's opium? Religion and economic attitudes," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 225-282, January.
    10. Gallant, A Ronald & Nychka, Douglas W, 1987. "Semi-nonparametric Maximum Likelihood Estimation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 363-390, March.
    11. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    12. Reder, Melvin W & Neumann, George R, 1980. "Conflict and Contract: The Case of Strikes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(5), pages 867-886, October.
    13. Hibbs, Douglas A., 1978. "On the Political Economy of Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(02), pages 153-175, April.
    14. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2009. "Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(3), pages 1095-1131.
    15. D'Orlando, Fabio & Ferrante, Francesco & Ruiu, Gabriele, 2011. "Culturally based beliefs and labor market institutions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 150-162, April.
    16. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
    17. Ashenfelter, Orley & Johnson, George E, 1969. "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 35-49, March.
    18. Kristoffel Grechenig & Andreas Nicklisch & Christian Thöni, 2010. "Punishment despite Reasonable Doubt – A Public Goods Experiment with Uncertainty over Contributions," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    19. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Ockenfels, Peter, 1996. "Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 593-604, May.
    20. Sendhil Mullainathan & Marianne Bertrand, 2001. "Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 67-72, May.
    21. Sap, Jolande, 1993. "Bargaining power and wages : A game-theoretic model of gender differences in union wage bargaining," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 25-48, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unofficial strike; trust; labour union; collective bargaining; self-serving bias;

    JEL classification:

    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2014_125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lenka Stastna). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/icunicz.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.