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Learning from Strike

Author

Listed:
  • Fabienne Tournadre

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Marie Claire Villeval

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper reports on an experimental study of the influence of asymmetric information and information spillovers on bargaining outcomes. It develops and tests Kuhn and Gu (1999) s model of learning in sequential wage negotiations, by means of two Ultimatum Bargaining Games with uncertainty on the proposer s side. Evidence shows that Dunlop s assertion of inflationary wage claims does not hold systematically and strike incidence is lowered by information spillovers, since claims are revised according to the previous bargaining outcomes. However, in the presence of fairness concerns, the ability to observe outcomes but not the bargaining process does not entail a reduction in information asymmetry sufficient to guarantee Pareto improving bargaining outcomes. Ce papier présente une étude expérimentale sur l'influence des asymétries d'information et de la diffusion de l'information entre firmes sur l'issue des négociations. Nous proposons un prolongement ainsi qu'un test du modèle de Kuhn et Gu (1999) concernant l'apprentissage dans des négociations séquentielles. Nous utilisons pour cela deux jeux d'ultimatum avec incertitude du coté du proposant. Les résultats expérimentaux montrent que l'hypothèse de Dunlop d'un biais inflationniste systématique des revendications salariales n'est jamais vérifiée et que conformément aux prédictions de Kuhn et Gu, la probabilité d'apparition d'une grève diminue en présence de diffusion de l'information. En effet, une révision des demandes en fonction du résultat des négociations passées est observée dans les données expérimentales. Pourtant, observer seulement le résultat des négociations passées et non le processus de négociation ne suffit à garantir une augmentation Pareto optimale des gains des joueurs. Les préoccupations d'équité entravent les effets bénéfiques de la diffusion de l'information entre firmes.
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Suggested Citation

  • Fabienne Tournadre & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Learning from Strike," Post-Print halshs-00180213, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00180213
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    Cited by:

    1. Alex Lehr & Agnes Akkerman & René Torenvlied, 2015. "Spillover and conflict in collective bargaining: evidence from a survey of Dutch union and firm negotiators," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 29(4), pages 641-660, August.
    2. Dorian Jullien & Alexandre Truc, 2024. "Towards a History of Behavioral and Experimental Economics in France," GREDEG Working Papers 2024-23, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    3. Lehr, Alex & Vyrastekova, Jana & Akkerman, Agnes & Torenvlied, René, 2016. "Spillovers and conflict in wage bargaining: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 59-68.
    4. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    5. Mikhail Drugov, 2021. "Bargaining with informational and payoff externalities," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 398-419, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strike;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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