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Learning from Strike

  • Fabienne Tournadre
  • Marie-Claire Villeval

This paper reports on an experimental study of the influence of asymmetric information and information spillovers on bargaining outcomes. It develops and tests Kuhn and Gu (1999) s model of learning in sequential wage negotiations, by means of two Ultimatum Bargaining Games with uncertainty on the proposer s side. Evidence shows that Dunlop s assertion of inflationary wage claims does not hold systematically and strike incidence is lowered by information spillovers, since claims are revised according to the previous bargaining outcomes. However, in the presence of fairness concerns, the ability to observe outcomes but not the bargaining process does not entail a reduction in information asymmetry sufficient to guarantee Pareto improving bargaining outcomes. Ce papier présente une étude expérimentale sur l'influence des asymétries d'information et de la diffusion de l'information entre firmes sur l'issue des négociations. Nous proposons un prolongement ainsi qu'un test du modèle de Kuhn et Gu (1999) concernant l'apprentissage dans des négociations séquentielles. Nous utilisons pour cela deux jeux d'ultimatum avec incertitude du coté du proposant. Les résultats expérimentaux montrent que l'hypothèse de Dunlop d'un biais inflationniste systématique des revendications salariales n'est jamais vérifiée et que conformément aux prédictions de Kuhn et Gu, la probabilité d'apparition d'une grève diminue en présence de diffusion de l'information. En effet, une révision des demandes en fonction du résultat des négociations passées est observée dans les données expérimentales. Pourtant, observer seulement le résultat des négociations passées et non le processus de négociation ne suffit à garantir une augmentation Pareto optimale des gains des joueurs. Les préoccupations d'équité entravent les effets bénéfiques de la diffusion de l'information entre firmes.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2001s-67.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-67
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