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The legal form of labour conflicts and their time persistence: an empirical analysis with a large firms' panel

  • Malo, Miguel A.
  • Sanchez-sanchez, Nuria

Using a panel of large firms from Spain, we check the relative time persistence of different types of labour conflicts such as strikes, collective conflicts, lockouts and other conflicts with lost working hours but without the previous stated legal forms for labour conflicts. We present random-effects probit estimations comparing observations with each type of conflicts with the same set of observations without any type of conflict. The results show that no legal form labour conflicts do not have long-term persistence (persistence is only in the short-term, from quarter to quarter), and the other types of conflicts suffer short and long-term persistence of confliction at the firm level, corresponds to strikes the higher size of both types of persistence. As short and long term persistence of strikes have almost the same size these results do not support asymmetric information theories of strike.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30117.

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Date of creation: 06 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30117
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  1. Card, David, 1988. "Longitudinal Analysis of Strike Activity," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(2), pages 147-76, April.
  2. Sergi Jimenez-Martin & José M. Labeaga & Mariluz Marco, 1996. "Algunos factores explicativos de la existencia de huelgas durante la negociación colectiva en España," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 217-242, May.
  3. Harrison, Alan & Stewart, Mark, 1989. "Cyclical Fluctuations in Strike Durations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 827-41, September.
  4. Card, David, 1990. "Strikes and Wages: A Test of an Asymmetric Information Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 625-59, August.
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  6. Tracy, Joseph S, 1986. "An Investigation into the Determinants of U.S. Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 423-36, June.
  7. Tracy, Joseph S, 1987. "An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 149-73, April.
  8. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen.
  9. Hayes, Beth, 1984. "Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 57-83, January.
  10. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2005. "Simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic, nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 39-54.
  11. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March.
  12. Sergi Jimenez-Martin, 2015. "Strike Outcomes and Wage Settlements in Spain," Working Papers 126, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  13. Alan Harrison & Mark B. Stewart, 1993. "Strike Duration and Strike Size," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(4), pages 830-49, November.
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  15. Carlos Garcia-Serrano & Miguel A. Malo, 2002. "Worker Turnover, Job Turnover and Collective Bargaining in Spain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 40(1), pages 69-85, 03.
  16. Sheena McConnell, 1990. "Cyclical fluctuations in strike activity," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 44(1), pages 130-143, October.
  17. Jimenez-Martin, Sergi, 1999. "Controlling for Endogeneity of Strike Variables in the Estimation of Wage Settlement Equations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(3), pages 583-606, July.
  18. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  19. García-Serrano, Carlos & Malo, Miguel A., 2009. "The impact of union direct voice on voluntary and involuntary absenteeism," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 372-383, March.
  20. Reder, Melvin W & Neumann, George R, 1980. "Conflict and Contract: The Case of Strikes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(5), pages 867-86, October.
  21. Juan Francisco Canal Domínguez & César Rodríguez Gutiérrez, 2004. "Collective Bargaining and Within-firm Wage Dispersion in Spain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 42(3), pages 481-506, 09.
  22. Kennan, John, 1987. "The economics of strikes," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1091-1137 Elsevier.
  23. Ashenfelter, Orley & Johnson, George E, 1969. "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 35-49, March.
  24. Vuong, Quang H, 1989. "Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 307-33, March.
  25. Siebert, W Stanley & Addison, John T, 1981. "Are Strikes Accidential?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(362), pages 389-404, June.
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