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The Effect Of Collective Bargaining Legislation On Strikes And Wages

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  • Peter Cramton
  • Morley Gunderson
  • Joseph Tracy

Abstract

Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January, 1967, to March, 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, general contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and employers better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to significantly higher negotiation costs and redistribution of quasi-rents from employers to unions. © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph Tracy, 1999. "The Effect Of Collective Bargaining Legislation On Strikes And Wages," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(3), pages 475-487, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:81:y:1999:i:3:p:475-487
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    Cited by:

    1. Jörg Oechssler & Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2015. "Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 565-588, December.
    2. Robert Rich & Joseph Tracy, 2004. "Uncertainty and Labor Contract Durations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 270-287, February.
    3. Belloc, Filippo, 2021. "Industrial actions and firing regimes: How deregulating worker “Exit” reshapes worker “Voice”," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 251-264.
    4. Goerke, Laszlo & Schnabel, Claus, 2002. "On strike insurance," Discussion Papers 12, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Chair of Labour and Regional Economics.
    5. Filippo Belloc, 2019. "Labor Conflict at the Workplace: Do Dismissal Regulations Matter?," Department of Economics University of Siena 806, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    6. Huberman, Michael & Young, Denise, 2002. "Hope against Hope: Strike Activity in Canada, 1920-1939," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 315-354, July.
    7. Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, 2003. "Unions, Bargaining and Strikes," Papers of Peter Cramton 02ubs, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 05 Sep 2002.
    8. Michael Huberman & Denise Young, 2000. "Hope against Hope: Persistent Canadian Unions in the Interwar Years," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-28, CIRANO.
    9. Sergi Jiménez-Martín & Jaume Garcia, 2010. "Initial offers and outcomes in wage bargaining: who wins?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 815-846, December.
    10. Budd, John W., 2000. "The effect of strike replacement legislation on employment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 225-247, March.
    11. Sadat Reza & Paul Rilstone, 2016. "Semiparametric Efficiency Bounds and Efficient Estimation of Discrete Duration Models with Unspecified Hazard Rate," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(5), pages 693-726, May.
    12. Carola Braun & Katrin Rehdanz & Ulrich Schmidt, 2018. "Exploring public perception of environmental technology over time," Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 61(1), pages 143-160, January.
    13. Michele Campolieti & Robert Hebdon & Benjamin Dachis, 2016. "Collective Bargaining in the Canadian Public Sector, 1978–2008: The Consequences of Restraint and Structural Change," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 54(1), pages 192-213, March.
    14. Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 121-147, November.
    15. Paul Duffy & Susan Johnson, 2009. "The Impact of Anti-Temporary Replacement Legislation on Work Stoppages: Empirical Evidence from Canada," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 35(1), pages 99-120, March.
    16. Elegbede Sikirulahi Tunde & Samuel Chidiebere Okeke & Jamiu Salam Abiodun, 2020. "Trade Unions’ Reactions to Non-implementation of Collective Agreements in the Lagos State Public Sector," Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, Economics and Finance, Michael Laurence, vol. 2(4), pages 83-94.
    17. Cramton, Peter & Tracy, Joseph, 1998. "The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(4), pages 667-701, October.
    18. Lesch, Hagen, 2017. "Konflikteskalation in Tarifverhandlungen: Methode, Indikatoren und empirische Befunde [Escalation of collective bargaining: Methods, indicators and empirical findings]," Industrielle Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management, Verlag Barbara Budrich, vol. 24(1), pages 31-53.
    19. Diaz-Moreno, Carlos & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E., 2000. "Collective bargaining under complete information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19337, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Kai-Uwe Kuuhn & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Union Power, Replacement and Labour Market Dynamics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 317-343, April.
    21. Gürtzgen, Nicole & Garloff, Alfred, 2008. "Innovationen in den Rahmenbedingungen von Tarifverhandlungen: Endbericht zum Projekt," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 110513.
    22. John Budd & Yijiang Wang, "undated". "Labor Policy and Investment," Working Papers 0502, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy

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