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Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly

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  • Ana Mauleon
  • Vincent Vannetelbosch

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 1999. "Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 19-40, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:69:y:1999:i:1:p:19-40
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01231209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Francis K. Cheung & Carl Davidson, 1991. "Bargaining Structure and Strike Activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 345-371, May.
    3. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1996. "Testing between alternative wage-employment bargaining models using Belgian aggregate data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 43-64, August.
    4. Bensaid, Bernard & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 1991. "Negotiation of profit-sharing contracts in industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1069-1085, July.
    5. Fung, K. C., 1989. "Unemployment, profit-sharing and Japan's economic success," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 783-796, April.
    6. Joel Watson, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 573-594.
    7. Stewart, Geoff, 1989. "Profit-sharing in cournot oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 221-224, December.
    8. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
    9. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages 87-130, Supplemen.
    10. Wadhwani, Sushil, 1988. "Profit-sharing as a cure for unemployment : Some doubts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 59-68, March.
    11. Bernard Bensaïd & Serge Federbusch & Robert Gary-Bobo, 1990. "Sur quelques propriétés stratégiques de l'intéressement des salariés dans l'industrie," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(4), pages 621-650.
    12. Sandeep Bhargava & Tim Jenkinson, "undated". "Explicit versus Implicit Profit Sharing and the Determination of Wages: Microeconomic Evidence from the UK," Discussion Papers 93/3, Department of Economics, University of York.
    13. Pierre Cahuc & Brigitte Dormont, 1992. "L'intéressement en France : allégement du coût salarial ou incitation à l'effort ?," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 257(1), pages 35-44.
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    Cited by:

    1. Archontis L. Pantsios & Solomon W. Polachek, 2017. "How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(2), pages 149-161, June.
    2. Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz, 2016. "Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 15(3), pages 173-195, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot oligopoly; wage bargaining; profit sharing; incomplete information; strike activity; JEL classification; C78; J50;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General

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