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Efficiency Wages, Unio-Firm Bargaining, and Strikes

Author

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  • MAULEON, Ana

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES);UNIVERSITY THE BASQUE COUNTRY (Spain))

  • VANNETLEBOSCH, Vincent J.

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) ; Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS))

Abstract

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that efficiency wage effects do not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the productivity enhancing effects of paying higher wages are sufficiently large, then efficiency wage effects still increase the wage of equilibrium. More surprisingly, we show that efficiency wage effects increase the strike activity.

Suggested Citation

  • MAULEON, Ana & VANNETLEBOSCH, Vincent J., 2001. "Efficiency Wages, Unio-Firm Bargaining, and Strikes," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2001010, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001010
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2001-10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1996. "Testing between alternative wage-employment bargaining models using Belgian aggregate data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 43-64, August.
    3. Campbell, Carl M, III, 1993. "Do Firms Pay Efficiency Wages? Evidence with Data at the Firm Level," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(3), pages 442-470, July.
    4. Garino, Gaia & Martin, Christopher, 2000. "Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 181-185, November.
    5. Layard, Richard & Nickell, Stephen & Jackman, Richard, 2005. "Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199279173.
    6. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages 87-130, Supplemen.
    7. Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Relative Wages, Efficiency Wages, and Keynesian Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 383-388, May.
    8. Joel Watson, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 573-594.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tobias Kronenberg, 2008. "How does reciprocal behaviour of workers influence the wage setting of unions?," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 303-320, December.
    2. Gustavo Gonzaga & Beatriz Muriel & Cristina Terra, 2005. "Abertura Comercial, Desigualdade Salarial E Sindicalização," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33rd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 073, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wages; Bargaining; Strikes; Efficiency wages;

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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