A note on the impact of procedures in strike models. The case of bargaining structure
For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10473945
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael Wallerstein & Miriam Golden & Peter Lange, 1997. "Unions, Employers' Associations, and Wage-Setting Institutions in Northern and Central Europe, 1950â€“1992," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(3), pages 379-401, April.
- Wang, Yijiang, 1995. "Firm's information-sharing policy and strike incidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 73-76, April.
- Goerke, Laszlo, 1998. "Taxes, Strikes and Wages," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 117-132, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:1998025. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sebastien SCHILLINGS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.