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A note on the impact of procedures in strike models. The case of bargaining structure

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  • Laszlo GOERKE

    (Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik)

Abstract

For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.

Suggested Citation

  • Laszlo GOERKE, 1998. "A note on the impact of procedures in strike models. The case of bargaining structure," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1998025, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:1998025
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/1998025.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wang, Yijiang, 1995. "Firm's information-sharing policy and strike incidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 73-76, April.
    2. Goerke, Laszlo, 1998. "Taxes, Strikes and Wages," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 117-132, April.
    3. Michael Wallerstein & Miriam Golden & Peter Lange, "undated". "Unions, Employers Associations, and Wage-Setting Institutions in North and Central Europe, 1950-1992," IPR working papers 96-12, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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