Bargaining Power, Strike Duration, and Wage Outcomes: An Analysis of Strikes in the 1880s
We study strike durations and outcomes for some 2000 disputes that occurred between 1881 and 1886. Most post-strike bargaining settlements in the 1880s fell into one of two categories: either a union "victory", characterized by a significant wage gain or hours cut, or a union "defeat", characterized by the resumption of work at the previous terms of employment. We find a strong negative relation between strike duration and the value of the settlement to workers. reflecting the declining probability of a union victory among longer strikes. For the subset of strikes over wage increases we estimate a structural model that includes equations for the capitulation times of the two parties and a specification of the wage increase conditional on a union victory. This framework provides a simple index of employees' relative bargaining power. based on the relative time to a union capitulation. Employees' relative bargaining power was higher in disputes involving fewer workers and in union ordered strikes. but substantially lower after the Haymarket Square incident in Chicago in 1886.
|Date of creation:||May 1992|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 32-61, January 1995.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ashenfelter, O. & Currie, J. & Farber, H.S., 1990.
"An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbritation Systems,"
562, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-33, November.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," NBER Working Papers 3417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ashenfelter, O. & Currie, J. & Farber, H.S. & Spiegel, M., 1990. "An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbitration Systems," Papers 55, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Working Papers 647, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- McConnell, Sheena, 1989. "Strikes, Wages, and Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 801-15, September.
- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen.
- Moffitt, Robert, 1985. "Unemployment insurance and the distribution of unemployment spells," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 85-101, April.
- Hayes, Beth, 1984. "Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 57-83, January.
- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993.
"Bargaining with Private Information,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
- Ashenfelter, Orley & Johnson, George E, 1969. "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 35-49, March.
- Joel Sobel & Takahashi, 1983. "A Multi-stage Model of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 255, David K. Levine.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4075. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.