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Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Cooperative Solutions: Generalized Maximands of CES Form

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  • Ana Paula Martins

Abstract

This note suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions as special cases. As an alternative, a Stone-Geary formulation is forwarded, weighing both the distances to the threat and to the ideal point, along with the corresponding CES generalization. Interpretations of the implied equilibrium solutions – generalizable to n-person cooperative games – are provided, arising as equations balancing geometric averages of measures of attitude towards (large) risk(s) of the players.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana Paula Martins, 2002. "Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Cooperative Solutions: Generalized Maximands of CES Form," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2002_05, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
  • Handle: RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2002_05
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    File URL: http://www.eeri.eu/documents/wp/EERI_RP_2002_05.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Ana Paula Martins, 2011. "Compliance with the Institutional Wage in Dualistic Models," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 54(2), pages 93-126.
    2. Ana Paula Martins, 2010. "Splitting Games: Nash Equilibrium and the Optimisation Problem," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 53(1), pages 1-28.
    3. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2002. "Striking Features of the Labor Market," EERI Research Paper Series EERI RP 2002/08, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    4. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2013. "Striking Features of the Labor Market: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 25-53.
    5. William H. Greene & Ana P. Martins, 2013. "Striking Features of the Labor Market: Theory," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 1-24.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-Person Cooperative Games; Cooperative Games Maximands; Opportunism; Pessimism.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D39 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Other
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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