Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information
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Other versions of this item:
- John Kennan, 2001. "Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 719-755.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Huan Xie, 2013. "Bargaining with uncertain value distributions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1047-1066.
- James M. Malcomson, 2016.
"Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 317-346, January.
- James Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information," Economics Series Working Papers 633, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- James Malcomson, 2015. "Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 5462, CESifo Group Munich.
- Battaglini, Marco, 2007.
"Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 213-246, August.
- Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 5014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, May.
- Loginova, Oksana & Taylor, Curtis, 2003. "Price Experimentation with Strategic Buyers," Working Papers 03-02, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- J. Benjamin & P. Chinloy & G. Jud & D. Winkler, 2007. "Do Some People Work Harder than Others? Evidence from Real Estate Brokerage," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 95-110, July.
- repec:eee:ejores:v:266:y:2018:i:3:p:1044-1061 is not listed on IDEAS
- Phelan, Christopher, 2006. "Public trust and government betrayal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 27-43, September.
- Elizabeth Hemphill, 2007. "Factors Affecting Real Estate Broker Selection: What Really Counts?," International Real Estate Review, Asian Real Estate Society, vol. 10(1), pages 1-25.
- Asker, John & Cantillon, Estelle, 2005. "Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter," CEPR Discussion Papers 5276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June.
- Lemke, Robert J., 2004. "Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1847-1875, July.
More about this item
KeywordsINFORMATION ; CONTRACTS;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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