Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty
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- Peter C. Cramton, 1984. "Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 579-593.
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Cited by:
- Gregory Dees, J. & Cramton, Peter C., 1991.
"Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality In Practice,"
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More about this item
Keywords
Bargaining; Delay; Incomplete Information;JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-PKE-1998-06-03 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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