IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v55y1987i6p1367-89.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Cho, In-Koo

Abstract

The author proposes a refinement of seq uential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing a restri ction proposed for signaling games in Cho and D. M. Kreps (1987). The restriction is that beliefs must not assign positive weight to the p ossibilities that can be excluded through reasonable introspection ba sed on the data available as common knowledge. A new technique is dev eloped in order to prove the existence of forward induction equilibri um, which consists of two steps. First, the author establishes the ge neric existence of forward induction equilibrium by exploiting the re sults of E. Kohlberg and J. F. Mertens (1986). Then, he shows that th e forward induction equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuou s in the outcome space with respect to the changes of parameters of t he game. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Cho, In-Koo, 1987. "A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1367-1389, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:6:p:1367-89
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198711%2955%3A6%3C1367%3AAROSE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. John C. Persons, "undated". "Fully Revealing Equilibria with Suboptimal Investment," Research in Financial Economics 9507, Ohio State University.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
    3. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
    4. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
    5. Kaya, Ayça, 2009. "Repeated signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.
    6. repec:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:489-516 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Facundo Albornoz & Joan-Maria Esteban & Paolo Vanin, 2009. "Government Information Transparency," Working Papers 392, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    8. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
    9. Sun, Lan, 2016. "Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 557, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    10. Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2009. "The Perverse Effects of Outside Options on Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 210-229, June.
    11. repec:spr:grdene:v:6:y:1997:i:6:d:10.1023_a:1008684225781 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Chlaß, Nadine & Perea, Andrés, 2016. "How do people reason in dynamic games?," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145881, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
    14. Lemke, Robert J., 2004. "Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1847-1875, July.
    15. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Ravid, S. Abraham, 1999. "Asymmetric Information, Corporate Myopia, and Capital Gains Tax Rates: An Analysis of Policy Prescriptions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 205-231, July.
    16. Persons, John C., 2000. "Fully revealing equilibria with suboptimal investment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 331-344, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:6:p:1367-89. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.