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A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Andrés Perea & Elias Tsakas, 2019. "Limited focus in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 571-607, June.
  2. Deepanshu Vasal & Achilleas Anastasopoulos, 2016. "Decentralized Bayesian learning in dynamic games: A framework for studying informational cascades," Papers 1607.06847, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2018.
  3. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  4. Francesc Dilmé, 2023. "Sequentially Stable Outcomes," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 254, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  5. Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Dongwoo, 2023. "Testing rational hypotheses in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
  6. Facundo Albornoz & Joan Esteban & Paolo Vanin, 2009. "Government Information Transparency," Discussion Papers 09-03, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  7. Dilmé, Francesc, 2025. "Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 293-312.
  8. Sun, Lan, 2016. "Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 557, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  9. Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  10. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
  11. Francesc Dilmé, 2024. "Sequentially Stable Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(4), pages 1097-1134, July.
  12. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Ravid, S. Abraham, 1999. "Asymmetric Information, Corporate Myopia, and Capital Gains Tax Rates: An Analysis of Policy Prescriptions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 205-231, July.
  13. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Catonini, Emiliano, 2024. "The epistemic spirit of divinity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  14. John C. Persons, "undated". "Fully Revealing Equilibria with Suboptimal Investment," Research in Financial Economics 9507, Ohio State University.
  15. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
  16. Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  17. Perea, Andrés, 2017. "Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 489-516.
  18. Benjamin Hébert, 2018. "Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2214-2252.
  19. Feng, Hong & Fu, Qiang & Zhang, Lan, 2020. "How to Launch a New Durable Good: A Signaling Rationale for Hunger Marketing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  20. Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2009. "The Perverse Effects of Outside Options on Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 210-229, June.
  21. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
  22. Kjell Hausken, 1997. "Game-theoretic and Behavioral Negotiation Theory," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(6), pages 511-528, December.
  23. Huang, Xuesong, 2024. "Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
  24. Chlaß, Nadine & Perea, Andrés, 2016. "How do people reason in dynamic games?," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145881, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  25. Francesc Dilmé, 2025. "Fully Self-Justifiable Outcomes," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 375, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  26. Kaya, Ayça, 2009. "Repeated signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.
  27. Lemke, Robert J., 2004. "Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1847-1875, July.
  28. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
  29. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
  30. Persons, John C., 2000. "Fully revealing equilibria with suboptimal investment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 331-344, September.
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