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Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game

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  • Weinberger, Catherine J.

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  • Weinberger, Catherine J., 2000. "Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 262-293, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:31:y:2000:i:2:p:262-293
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 97-109.
    2. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 188-201.
    3. Eddie Dekel., 1989. "Simultaneous Offers and the Inefficiency of Bargaining: A Two-Period Example," Economics Working Papers 89-112, University of California at Berkeley.
    4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1985. "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1151-1172, September.
    5. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 240-252.
    6. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-399, March.
    7. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 327-360.
    8. Chaim Fershtman, 1986. "The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining," Discussion Papers 689, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The importance of the agenda in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 224-238.
    10. Joseph Farrell & Nancy T. Gallini, 1988. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 673-694.
    11. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 327-360.
    12. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1988. "On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 601-611, May.
    13. Sakovics Jozsef, 1993. "Delay in Bargaining Games with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 78-95.
    14. Dekel, Eddie, 1990. "Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 300-308.
    15. Bac, Mehmet & Raff, Horst, 1996. "Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 125-134.
    16. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
    17. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius, 1997. "A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 144-148.
    18. Oliver Hart, 1989. "Bargaining and Strikes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 25-43.
    19. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1991. "A Note on Bargaining over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 290-292.
    20. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June.
    21. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 232-236.
    22. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 306-321.
    23. Joel Sobel & Ichiro Takahashi, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 411-426.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Flamini, Francesca, 2007. "First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 138-157.
    2. repec:spr:grdene:v:23:y:2014:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-012-9319-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 169-191.
    4. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    5. Francesca Flamini, "undated". "First Things First? The Agenda Formation Problem for Multi-issue Committees," Working Papers 2001_19, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    6. Emilie Dargaud, 2005. "Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated product industry," Post-Print halshs-00180041, HAL.
    7. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 385-399.
    8. Marie-Claire Villeval & Manfred Konigstein, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations," Working Papers 0508, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    9. repec:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:3:d:10.1023_a:1011210015279 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 385-399.

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