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DOI: 10.1023/A:1011210015279
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Cited by:
- Agndal, Henrik, 2007. "Current trends in business negotiation research: An overview of articles published 1996-2005," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Business Administration 2007:003, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Michael J. Cotter & James A. Henley, 2017. "Gender Contrasts in Negotiation Impasse Rates," Management, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 12(1), pages 3-25.
- Olivier Bochet & Manshu Khanna & Simon Siegenthaler, 2024.
"Beyond Dividing the Pie: Multi-Issue Bargaining in the Laboratory,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(1), pages 163-191.
- Olivier Bochet & Manshu Khanna & Simon Siegenthaler, 2021. "Beyond the Dividing Pie: Multi-Issue Bargaining in the Laboratory," Working Papers 20210070, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Sep 2021.
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dynamic game; negotiations; contributive efforts;All these keywords.
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