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Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining

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  • In, Younghwan
  • Serrano, Roberto

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  • In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 385-399, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:53:y:2004:i:3:p:385-399
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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
    3. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    4. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J, 1997. "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple-Issue Bargaining," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(256), pages 669-680, November.
    5. Bac, Mehmet & Raff, Horst, 1996. "Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 125-134, March.
    6. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-565, May.
    7. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-252, March.
    8. Fershtman, Chaim, 2000. "A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 216-227, February.
    9. Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The importance of the agenda in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 224-238, September.
    10. Inderst, Roman, 2000. "Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 64-82, January.
    11. Weinberger, Catherine J., 2000. "Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 262-293, May.
    12. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 1999. "Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 561-575.
    13. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius, 1997. "A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 144-148, April.
    14. Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 154-168, September.
    15. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2003. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining (II): unrestricted agendas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 325-331, June.
    16. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2017. "Dynamic Agenda Setting," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 1-32, May.
    2. Harstad, Bård, 2023. "Pledge-and-review bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    3. Rupa Chanda, 2008. "Trade in Health Services," Working Papers id:1758, eSocialSciences.
    4. Flamini, Francesca, 2007. "First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 138-157, May.
    5. Harstad, Bård, 2021. "A Theory of Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," Memorandum 5/2022, Oslo University, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2021.
    6. Bloch, Francis & de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2010. "Cores of combined games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2424-2434, November.
    7. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2003. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining (II): unrestricted agendas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 325-331, June.
    8. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2015. "Bargaining with non-convexities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 151-161.
    9. Manfred Königstein & Marie Claire Villeval, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations," Post-Print halshs-00175021, HAL.
    10. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    11. Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg, 2007. "Rent shifting and the order of negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1109-1125, October.
    12. Königstein, Manfred & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2010. "Efficiency and behavioral considerations in labor negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 599-611, August.
    13. Snyder, Christopher M. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2005. "Multiproject contact in research joint ventures: evidence and theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 459-486, December.
    14. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2021. "Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    15. Sgobbi, Alessandra & Carraro, Carlo, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 8224, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    16. Mao, Liang & Zhang, Tianyu, 2017. "A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 79-82.
    17. Louta, Malamati & Roussaki, Ioanna & Pechlivanos, Lambros, 2008. "An intelligent agent negotiation strategy in the electronic marketplace environment," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 187(3), pages 1327-1345, June.
    18. D r. (elect.) Julia Korosteleva, "undated". "Maximising Seigniorage and Inflation Tax: The Case of Belarus," Working Papers 2006_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    19. Johanna Goertz, 2011. "Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 547-563, April.
    20. Francesca Flamini, "undated". "A Note on Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 2003_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    21. Younghwan In, 2006. "A Note on Multi-Issue Bargaining with a Finite Set of Alternatives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 79-90, April.
    22. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & García-Segarra, Jaume & Ginés-Vilar, Miguel, 2017. "Super-additivity and concavity are equivalent for Pareto optimal n-agent bargaining solutions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 50-52.
    23. Andrew Hughes Hallett & John Lewis, 2005. "Fiscal Discipline before and after EMU - Permanent Weight Loss or Crash Diet?," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0516, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    24. Acharya, Avidit & Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2150-2163.

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