First Things First? The Agenda Formation Problem for Multi-issue Committees
It is often argued that multi-issue committees should discuss issues simultaneously to avoid ineciency. However, in practice, parties can be constrained to discuss issues sequentially and in this case, existing game-theoretical models give inconclusive results: either parties have dierent preferences over agendas or they are indierent. We show that when there is an important issue, parties have the same preferences over agendas, in particular they prefer to discuss the most important issue Þrst. Moreover, when an issue is dicult/urgent (in the sense that the rejection of a proposal on this issue implies a game breakdown with a positive probability) parties prefer to postpone the negotiations over the dicult/urgent issue. We highlight several incentives that players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas. Since theseareoften in conßict, the existence of a Pareto optimal agenda is of particular interest.
|Date of creation:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Adam Smith Building, Glasgow G12 8RT|
Phone: 0141 330 4618
Fax: 0141 330 4940
Web page: http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/business/research/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Muthoo Abhinay, 1995. "Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 590-598, August.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, 1993. "Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination," Economics Discussion Papers 10021, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Weinberger, Catherine J., 2000. "Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 262-293, May.
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, February.
- Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 1999. "Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: A Bargaining Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 956-975, August.
- Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Francesca Flamini, "undated". "A Note on Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 2003_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The importance of the agenda in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 224-238, September.
- Chaim Fershtman, 1986. "The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining," Discussion Papers 689, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2003. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining (II): unrestricted agendas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 325-331, June.
- Younghwan In & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining (II): Unrestricted Agendas," Departmental Working Papers wp0206, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
- Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J, 1997. "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple-Issue Bargaining," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(256), pages 669-680, November.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Inderst, Roman, 2000. "Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 64-82, January.
- Inderst, Roman, 1998. "Multi-Issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-35, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 385-399, March.
- Younghwan In & Roberto Serrano, 2000. "Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 2000-08, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Lang, Kevin & Rosenthal, Robert W, 2001. "Bargaining Piecemeal or All at Once?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 526-540, July.
- Flamini, F., 2000. "Agenda Formation in Issue-by-Issue Bargaining Games," Discussion Papers 0001, Exeter University, Department of Economics. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2001_19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jeanette Findlay)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.