Agenda Formation in Issue-by-Issue Bargaining Games
This paper investigates the agenda formation problem by means of two-player two-cake sequential bargaining models. Players differ not only in their time preferences but also for their cake valuations; moreover they face a risk of breakdown in the negotiation process. The main model is characterised by risk of breakdown after the agreement on the first issue, transmission of delays between the negotiations over the two issues, and alternating offer (both after a rejection and an acceptance). Alternative models also are analysed to highlight the complex interplay of forces in the bargaining process over different issues.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU|
Phone: (01392) 263218
Fax: (01392) 263242
Web page: http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/about/departments/economics/
More information through EDIRC