First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees
It is often argued that multi-issue committees should discuss issues simultaneously to avoid ineciency. However, in practice, parties can be constrained to discuss issues sequentially and in this case, existing game-theoretical models give inconclusive results: either parties have dierent preferences over agendas or they are indierent. We show that when there is an important issue, parties have the same preferences over agendas, in particular they prefer to discuss the most important issue Þrst. Moreover, when an issue is dicult/urgent (in the sense that the rejection of a proposal on this issue implies a game breakdown with a positive probability) parties prefer to postpone the negotiations over the dicult/urgent issue. We highlight several incentives that players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas. Since theseareoften in conßict, the existence of a Pareto optimal agenda is of particular interest.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Francesca Flamini, . "A Note on Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 2003_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Inderst, Roman, 1998.
"Multi-Issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
98-35, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Flamini, F., 2000. "Agenda Formation in Issue-by-Issue Bargaining Games," Discussion Papers 0001, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Younghwan In & Roberto Serrano, 2000.
"Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining,"
2000-08, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Younghwan In & Roberto Serrano, 2002.
"Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining (II): Unrestricted Agendas,"
Departmental Working Papers
wp0206, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
- In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2003. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining (II): unrestricted agendas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 325-331, June.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Fershtman, Chaim, 1990.
"The importance of the agenda in bargaining,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 224-238, September.
- Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J, 1997. "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple-Issue Bargaining," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(256), pages 669-80, November.
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993.
"Equilibrium Binding Agreements,"
21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, June.
- Abhinay Muthoo, .
"Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationbship with Endogenous Termination,"
Economics Discussion Papers
422, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Muthoo Abhinay, 1995. "Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 590-598, August.
- Weinberger, Catherine J., 2000. "Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 262-293, May.
- Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 1999. "Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: A Bargaining Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 956-975, August.
- Lang, Kevin & Rosenthal, Robert W, 2001. "Bargaining Piecemeal or All at Once?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 526-40, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:63:y:2007:i:1:p:138-157. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.