Multi-Issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda
The first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues (the agenda) matters even if players become arbitrarily patient. This result rises the question which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues. It is found that simultaneous bargaining over ''packages'' should be a prevailing phenomenon, but we also point to the possibility of multiple equilibria involving even considerable delay.
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|Date of creation:||30 Oct 1998|
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