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References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 97-109.
- Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Option Values and Bargaining Delays," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 139-153, September.
- Kathryn E. Spier, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108.
- Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-399, March.
- William P. Rogerson, 1992. "Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 777-793.
- Kennan, J. & Wilson, R., 1991. "Bargaining with Private Information," Working Papers 90-01rev, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993.
"Bargaining with Private Information,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, pages 45-104.
- Silvestre, J., 1991. "The Market-Power Foundations of Macroeconomic Policy," Papers 374, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
- Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 154-168, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Elie Appelbaum, 2009. "Alternating Offers Union-Firm Bargaining: Order of Play and Efficiency," Working Papers 2009_02, York University, Department of Economics.
- Appelbaum, Elie, 2011. "Union-firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 235-245, March.
- Shingo Ishiguro, 2010. "Holdup, search, and inefficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 307-338.
- Wait, A., 2001. "Delays in Bargaining With Incompelete Contracts," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 809, The University of Melbourne.
- repec:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:3:d:10.1023_a:1011210015279 is not listed on IDEAS
- Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2015. "Strategic disclosure of feasible options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 145-165.
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