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Historical Property Rights, Sociality, and the Emergence of Impersonal Exchange in Long-distance Trade

  • Erik Kimbrough
  • Vernon Smith
  • Bart Wilson

    ()

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University)

This laboratory experiment explores the extent to which impersonal exchange emerges from personal exchange with opportunities for long-distance trade. We design a three-commodity production and exchange economy in which agents in three geographically separated villages must develop multilateral exchange networks to import a third good only available abroad. For treatments, we induce two distinct institutional histories to investigate how past experience with property rights affects the evolution of specialization and exchange. We find that a history of un-enforced property rights hinders our subjects¡¯ ability to develop the requisite personal social arrangements necessary to support specialization and effectively exploit impersonal long-distance trade.

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File URL: http://www.gmu.edu/schools/chss/economics/icesworkingpapers.gmu.edu/pdf/1003.pdf
File Function: Latest version, 2006
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Paper provided by George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science in its series Working Papers with number 1003.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision: Oct 2006
Handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1003
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