Virtual world order: the economics and organizations of virtual pirates
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More about this item
KeywordsAnarchy; Piracy; Virtual worlds; Conflict-aversion; Private rules; Ordered anarchy; P16; P48; D74; C90; Z13;
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
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