Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices
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- Peter Leeson, 2014. "Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 365-379, June.
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More about this item
KeywordsPirates Organized crime Signalling Reputation;
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