Organized Crime or Individual Crime? Endogenous Size of a Criminal Organization and the Optimal Law Enforcement
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- Guha, Brishti & Guha, Ashok S., 2011. "Pirates and traders: Some economics of pirate-infested seas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 147-150, May.
- Antony W. Dnes & Nuno Garoupa, 2010. "Behavior, Human Capital and the Formation of Gangs," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 517-529, November.
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- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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