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Unraveling Secessions

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  • Friedhelm Hentschel

Abstract

In many ethnically segregated countries, policy is directly linked to ethnicity, and thus, nonruling ethnic groups may suffer from the implemented policy. For these groups, a secession is one instrument to eliminate ethnic heterogeneity costs by implementing their own policy. However, leaving the country reduces economies of scale in the public good provision. Therefore, separatist ethnic groups face a trade-off between eliminating ethnic heterogeneity costs and losing economies of scale in the provision of public goods. I present a model for unraveling secessions in an ethnically segregated country. I use this model to derive conditions for the breakup of countries and to compare equilibrium behavior with and without the possibility of a consecutive secession. Among others, I find that a secessionist conflict will be more likely if there is a previous secession. Furthermore, aggregated conflict spending is larger in secessions with the possibility of a consecutive conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Friedhelm Hentschel, 2019. "Unraveling Secessions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(6), pages 1517-1541, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:63:y:2019:i:6:p:1517-1541
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002718792611
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
    2. Jean-Paul Azam, 2002. "Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(1), pages 131-153, February.
    3. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1995. "The Economics of Defense," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521447287.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friedhelm Hentschel, 2022. "Third-party intervention in secessions," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 65-82, March.

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