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A New Approach to Solving Production-Appropriation Games with Many Heterogeneous Players

Listed author(s):
  • Richard Cornes
  • Roger Hartley
  • Yuji Tamura

We set out a model of production and appropriation involving many players, who differ with respect to both resource endowments and productivities. We write down the model in a novel way that permits our analysis to avoid the proliferation of dimensions associated with the best response function approach as the number of heterogeneous players increases. We establish existence of a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and carry out some comparative static exercises.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2010/wp-cesifo-2010-05/cesifo1_wp3060.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3060.

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Date of creation: 2010
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3060
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  11. Szidarovszky, F & Yakowitz, S, 1977. "A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 18(3), pages 787-789, October.
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  13. Jack Hirshleifer, 1993. "The Dark Side of the Force," UCLA Economics Working Papers 702, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2008. "Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0806, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  15. Usher, D, 1987. "Theft as a Paradigm for Departures from Efficiency," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 235-252, June.
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  17. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2007. "Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1684-1707, September.
  18. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley & Yuji Tamura, 2010. "A New Approach to Solving Production-Appropriation Games with Many Heterogeneous Players," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2010-521, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  19. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
  20. Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Paradox Of Power," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 177-200, November.
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  26. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-712, June.
  27. Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger, 2003. "Risk Aversion, Heterogeneity and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 1-25, October.
  28. Alexander Karaivanov, 2009. "Heterogeneity, returns to scale, and collective action," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 771-807, May.
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