Kings and Vikings: On the Dynamics of Competitive Agglomeration
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- Matthew Baker & Erwin Bulte, 2010. "Kings and Vikings: on the dynamics of competitive agglomeration," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 207-227, June.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Andrew Young, 2015.
"From Caesar to Tacitus: changes in early Germanic governance circa 50 BC-50 AD,"
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- Andrew T. Young, 2016. "What does it take for a roving bandit settle down? Theory and an illustrative history of the Visigoths," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 75-102, July.
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More about this item
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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