IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v65y2008i3p227-252.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power

Author

Listed:
  • Joan Esteban
  • József Sákovics

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2008. "A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 227-252, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:65:y:2008:i:3:p:227-252 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-007-9093-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-007-9093-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Powell, Robert, 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 255-289, August.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Z. Spindler, 1976. "Endogenous bargaining power and the theory of small group collective choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 67-78, December.
    4. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    6. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    7. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 988-1010.
    8. O'Neill, Barry & Samet, Dov & Wiener, Zvi & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "Bargaining with an agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 139-153, July.
    9. Anbarci, Nejat & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2002. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-16.
    10. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-921, September.
    11. Horowitz, Andrew W, 1993. "Time Paths of Land Reform: A Theoretical Model of Reform Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1003-1010, September.
    12. Z. A. Spindler, 1974. "Endogenous Bargaining Power in Bilateral Monopoly and Bilateral Exchange," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 7(3), pages 463-474, August.
    13. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1999. "Conflict and Distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 379-415, August.
    14. Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "A meaningful two-person bargaining solution based on ordinal preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, pages 1-6.
    15. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:26:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1998. "Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 828-853, August.
    17. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
    18. Roemer, John E., 1988. "Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-31, June.
    19. Clara Ponsati & Joel Watson, 1998. "Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(4), pages 501-524.
    20. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kimbrough, Erik & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict," MPRA Paper 53253, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2017. "Religious co-option in autocracy: A theory inspired by history," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 395-412.
    3. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Side-payments and the costs of conflict," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 278-286.
    4. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2016. "Religious Seduction in Autocracy: A Theory Inspired by History," CEPR Discussion Papers 11258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Emily Tanimura & Sylvie Thoron, 2016. "How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree?," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(03), pages 1-17, September.
    6. Pierre André & Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2017. "Sitting on the fence: Pork - barrels and democratization under threat of conflict. The case of Ghana, 1996 - 2004," Working Papers hal-01619605, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; conflict; disagreement; C78; D74;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:65:y:2008:i:3:p:227-252. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.