A Meaningful Two-Person Bargaining Solution Based on Ordinal Preferences
In this note I argue that the traditional argument proving the non-existence of two-person ordinal bargaining solutions is misleading, and also provide an example of such a solution.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||Feb 2004|
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- Nejat Anbarci, 1993. "Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 245-258.
- Safra, Zvi & Samet, Dov, 2004.
"An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 129-142, January.
- Zvi Safra & Dov Samet, 2003. "An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players," Game Theory and Information 0310002, EconWPA.