The transit oil and gas pipeline and the role of bargaining: A non-technical discussion
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- Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2003.
"Endogenous bargaining power,"
13, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Sen, Arijit, 2000. "Multidimensional Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 425-50, May.
- Koskela, E. & Stenbacka, R., 2000. "Compensation and Bargaining with Entrepreneurship as the Outside Option," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 479, Department of Economics.
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