Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution
We start by considering the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, a real-life arbitration scheme where two parties select an arbitrator by alternately crossing off at each round one name from a given panel of arbitrators. We find out that the AS scheme is not invariant to â€œbadâ€\x9D alternatives. We then consider another alternating-move scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. We fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome sets of these above two schemes in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only. We also identify some of the typical equilibria of these above two schemes. We then analyze two additional alternating-move schemes in which playersâ€™ current proposals have to either honor or enhance their previous proposals. We show that the first schemeâ€™s equilibrium outcome set coincides with that of the AS scheme, and the equilibrium outcome set of the second scheme coincides with that of the VAOV scheme. Finally, it turns out that all schemesâ€™ equilibrium outcome sets converge to the Equal Area solutionâ€™s outcome of cooperative bargaining problem, if the alternatives are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possibility set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. Copyright Springer 2006
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Volume (Year): 61 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (08)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nejat Anbarci, 1993. "Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 245-258.
- David E. Bloom & Christopher L. Cavanagh, 1986.
"An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators,"
NBER Working Papers
1938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anbarci, Nejat & Bigelow, John P., 1994. "The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 133-142, October.
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