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Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution

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  • Nejat Anbarci

Abstract

We start by considering the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, a real-life arbitration scheme where two parties select an arbitrator by alternately crossing off at each round one name from a given panel of arbitrators. We find out that the AS scheme is not invariant to “badâ€\x9D alternatives. We then consider another alternating-move scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. We fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome sets of these above two schemes in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only. We also identify some of the typical equilibria of these above two schemes. We then analyze two additional alternating-move schemes in which players’ current proposals have to either honor or enhance their previous proposals. We show that the first scheme’s equilibrium outcome set coincides with that of the AS scheme, and the equilibrium outcome set of the second scheme coincides with that of the VAOV scheme. Finally, it turns out that all schemes’ equilibrium outcome sets converge to the Equal Area solution’s outcome of cooperative bargaining problem, if the alternatives are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possibility set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. Copyright Springer 2006

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  • Nejat Anbarci, 2006. "Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 21-50, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:1:p:21-50
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-4748-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bloom, David E & Cavanagh, Christopher L, 1986. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 408-422, June.
    2. Anbarci, Nejat & Bigelow, John P., 1994. "The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 133-142, October.
    3. Nejat Anbarci, 1993. "Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 245-258.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 421-441, February.
    3. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    4. Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Remzi Sanver, M., 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    5. Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash Program: Time for Retirement?," Working Papers 2020-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    6. Meir, Reshef & Kalai, Gil & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2018. "Bidding games and efficient allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 166-193.
    7. Zak, F., 2014. "Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice. II. Shame, Regret, Egoism and Altruism," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 12-40.

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